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Abstract 
Using inflation forecasts from the OECD Economic Outlook as proxy measures of inflation expectations, 
we examine the impact of inflation expectations on the sacrifice ratio for 20 OECD countries. The 
regression analysis considers four different empirical models of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio 
typically found in the existing literature. The impact of the level of inflation expectations is negative 
and significant, implying that a higher level of expected inflation is associated with lower sacrifice 
ratios. This result is consistent with the theoretical role of nominal wage and price rigidities in that 
reductions in wage and price stickiness diminish the tradeoffs between disinflations and output losses. 
Interaction effects indicate that higher levels of expected inflation allow policymakers to pursue ‘cold 
turkey’ inflation reductions even more aggressively. The effect of the change in inflation expectations 
is negative and significant, implying that faster adjusting inflation expectations are associated with 
lower sacrifice ratios. 
INTRODUCTION 
Using inflation forecasts from the OECD Economic Outlook as proxy measures of inflation expectations, 
we examine the impact of inflation expectations on the sacrifice ratio for 20 OECD countries. The 
regression analysis considers four different empirical models of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio 
typically found in the existing literature. The impact of the level of inflation expectations is negative 
and significant, implying that a higher level of expected inflation is associated with lower sacrifice 
ratios. This result is consistent with the theoretical role of nominal wage and price rigidities in that 
reductions in wage and price stickiness diminish the tradeoffs between disinflations and output losses. 
Interaction effects indicate that higher levels of expected inflation allow policymakers to pursue 'cold 
turkey' inflation reductions even more aggressively. The effect of the change in inflation expectations is 
negative and significant, implying that faster adjusting inflation expectations are associated with lower 
sacrifice ratios. 
There have been a number of studies on the determinants of the sacrifice ratio or the tradeoff 
between output and inflation. The sacrifice ratio was first quantified by Ball ([ 4]) to examine the 
output loss associated with a disinflationary episode. Early studies focused on the relationship 
between the sacrifice ratio and the speed of the disinflation, to determine whether a gradual 
disinflation or 'cold turkey' disinflation resulted in a lower output loss. Subsequent studies considered 
economy-wide characteristics such as the degree of trade openness, central bank independence, wage 
stickiness, the exchange rate regime or inflation targeting, and exchange-rate pass-through, to name a 
few. 
Theoretical models on ( 1) price/wage stickiness; ( 2) policymaking credibility/commitment; and ( 3) 
macroeconomic variability introduced via policy actions suggest channels that link inflation 
expectations, as well as the speed of adjustment of inflation expectations, to the inflation-output 
trade-off. Limiting consideration to price and wage stickiness, we would a priori assume an estimated 
negative relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. 
Once policy credibility effects are taken into account, however, the predicted sign of this relationship 
becomes less obvious, as endogenously determined inflation expectations and the credibility of 
macroeconomic policies can move together or in opposing directions. Empirical treatment of the 
influence of policy credibility would, therefore, yield an ambiguous prediction for the relationship 
between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. 
In contrast, policy-induced macroeconomic volatility, itself depending on policy credibility, impacts the 
optimal degree of wage stickiness that leads to output losses from disinflations. Taking this channel, by 
itself, into consideration suggests a positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice 
ratio. Overall, these three channels operating together through the macroeconomic policy process 
suggest a likely positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Given some 
degree of ambiguity, however, the relationship remains an empirical question, which is the motivation 
for this study. 
Using inflation forecasts from the OECD Economic Outlook as proxy measures of inflation expectations, 
we examine the impact of the level of inflation expectations and changes in inflation expectations on 
the sacrifice ratio for 20 OECD countries. The regression analysis considers four different empirical 
models of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio typically found in the existing literature. The first sets 
of regressions compare the impact of the level of inflation expectations prevailing at the beginning of a 
disinflationary episode to the effect of initial, or peak inflation at the beginning of a disinflationary 
period. The direct impact of the level of inflation expectations—or the total impact in models with 
interaction terms—is negative and significant in all models, implying that a higher level of expected 
inflation is associated with a lower sacrifice ratio. This result is consistent with the theoretical role of 
nominal price and wage rigidities, in that reductions in wage and price stickiness diminish the tradeoffs 
between disinflations and output losses. Interaction effects indicate that higher levels of expected 
inflation, consistent with reduced wage and price stickiness, allow policymakers to pursue 'cold turkey' 
inflation reductions even more aggressively. 
The role of the level of inflation expectations, however, differ from initial inflation when considering a 
model that includes a variable for central bank independence. We explore this difference by 
considering mediation effects via the Sobel-Goodman mediation test (Sobel, [25]). We find that initial 
inflation is a mediator—that is, it carries some of the influence of central bank independence to the 
sacrifice ratio. This suggests that a more independent central bank has the power to exploit the 
inflation-output tradeoff more when the level of inflation at the outset of a disinflation episode starts 
from a high level. Results for the level of inflation expectations imply that inflation expectations are not 
a mediator. 
A second set of regression models examines the role of changes in inflation expectations that occur 
over a disinflationary episode rather than the level of inflation expectations. Consistent with the results 
for the level of expectations, the effect of the change in inflation expectations is negative and 
significant in all four regression models, implying that faster-adjusting inflation expectations are 
associated with lower sacrifice ratios. Likewise, the interaction between changes in inflation 
expectations and the length of the disinflation is negative and significant, indicating that faster-
adjusting expectations allow policymakers to pursue disinflations even more quickly. In addition, 
changes in inflation expectations also have a mediation effect in models that include a measure of 
central-bank independence. Since the level of expected inflation does not have a mediation effect, 
whereas the change in expected inflation does, this implies that it is via a change in expectations that 
central banks can alter output while disinflating. Put in a different way, part of the impact of lowering 
inflation comes about through inducing a change in inflation expectations. 
A final set of regressions combines ( 1) initial inflation and changes in inflation expectations and ( 2) the 
level of inflation expectations and changes in inflation expectations. These results show that ( 1) initial 
inflation and changes in inflation expectations have unique and statistically significant effects and that 
( 2) the level of inflation expectations and the change in inflation expectations have unique and 
statistically significant effects. 
The following section examines alternative theoretical perspectives regarding the relationship between 
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Section 3 discusses the variables and data utilized to evaluate 
this relationship. Section 4 describes the empirical models and results. Section 5 discusses key 
implications and concludes by contemplating possible directions for future research. 
THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT 
Several theoretical rationales for how inflation expectations might be related to the sacrifice ratio are 
summarized in Table 1. A direct channel involves nominal wage and price rigidities often suggested as 
necessary for output losses to be associated with disinflations. Conceivable indirect channels operate 
through the credibility of authorities' policies, arise from underlying reputations of those policymaking 
authorities, or exist because of contributions of the authorities' policies to macroeconomic volatility. 
Table 1. Proposed channels relating expected inflation to the sacrifice ratio 
Channel Analytical 
framework 
Predicted relationship and basic mechanism 
Direct: 
  





Negative association between expected inflation and the 
sacrifice ratio: Lower nominal stickiness reduces the tradeoff 
between disinflations and output, so higher expected 









Ambiguous association between expected inflation and the 
sacrifice ratio: Increased variance of monetary control error 
boosts expected inflation while increasing the output loss 
from disinflations. Higher variance of the central bank's 
preference weight on its employment objective reduces its 
credibility, which raises expected inflation while increasing 






Positive association between expected inflation and the 
sacrifice ratio: If the central bank is tough and the private 
sector is weak, expected inflation and the output loss from 
disinflation fall to zero. If the central bank is weak and the 
private sector is tough, expected inflation and the output 
loss from disinflation both increase. 






Positive association between expected inflation and the 
sacrifice ratio: Fewer policy shocks and resulting higher 
macroeconomic policy credibility lower expected inflation 
and simultaneously reduce output losses from disinflations 
 
The direct channel via nominal wage and price rigidities 
A direct influence of nominal wage and price rigidities on the output losses associated with 
disinflations is the most straightforward rationale for a relationship between expected inflation and 
the sacrifice ratio. In traditional sticky-wage/price models that followed on the heels of those proposed 
by Fischer ([16]), Gray ([20]), and Taylor ([26]) and summarized within the Blinder and Mankiw ([ 9]) 
amalgamated 'archipelago-economy' model, nominal rigidities naturally create conditions that yield a 
short-term Phillips-curve tradeoff between the inflation rate and real GDP growth. 
Although many economists abandoned these traditional models of wage and price rigidity because of 
mismatches with predicted real wage dynamics, Ball ([ 5], [ 6]), Fuhrer and Moore ([18]), and Mankiw 
([23]) have shown that basic forward-looking New Keynesian models can adequately explain neither 
inflation persistence nor output losses from disinflations. Ascari and Ropele ([ 1]) show within a New 
Keynesian framework that a 'cold-turkey' disinflation can generate disinflation losses consistent with 
estimated sacrifice ratios when exogenously specified degrees of wage- and price-inflation indexation 
happen to lie within appropriate ranges. Nevertheless, consistent with Ball's original arguments, 
enabling such models to generate disinflationary output losses usually requires the introduction of 
separate policy-credibility considerations; see, for instance, Erceg and Levin ([15]) and Goodfriend and 
King ([19]). We shall return to this issue of traditional versus forward-looking New Keynesian 
perspectives on the sacrifice ratio in Section 5. 
Within the traditional nominal-stickiness models, reductions in wage and price stickiness yielded by 
higher actual and expected rates of product and input price inflation generate a diminished tradeoff 
between disinflations and aggregate output. Thus, in the presence of nominal wage and price 
rigidities, higher expected inflation is associated with a lower sacrifice ratio. 
The indirect macroeconomic policymaking channel 
Barro and Gordon ([ 7]) explained how positive mean inflation rates tend to arise in settings in which 
central banks lack credibility to commitments to restrain inflation. The substantial political economy 
literature that followed suggests channels through which the policy process could simultaneously 
influence expected inflation and output losses generated by disinflations. In his review of this 
substantial literature, Drazen ([14], Chapter 6) notes the importance of differentiating between the 
credibility of macroeconomic policies versus the credibility of policymakers themselves. We here focus 
on how the credibility of macroeconomic policymaking can impinge upon the relationship between 
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. We shall contemplate the reputational effects in the 
following subsection. 
In Cukierman's ([11], Chapter 9) classic study of key determinants of central bank credibility, low 
central credibility is measured by a summary statistic based on negative absolute deviations of planned 
money growth from the public's expectation of planned money growth. The value of this credibility 
measure depends negatively on the variance of the central bank's monetary control error; the variance 
of innovations to its employment objective; and the slope of a Phillips curve relationship relating the 
deviation of employment from its natural level to the deviation of inflation from its expected level. In 
Cukierman's model, the endogenously-determined expected inflation of private agents is higher when 
the variance of the monetary control error is greater. A rise in the variance of the monetary control 
error, however, pushes down the value of Cukierman's credibility measure and hence raises the cost of 
a disinflation. Hence, when the central bank experiences a larger variance of the monetary control 
error, the result in Cukierman's model is higher mean inflation at the same time that lower credibility, 
and hence a higher output loss, results from a disinflation. 
Nevertheless, Cukierman's credibility measure also depends on the variance of innovations to the 
central bank's employment objective, which could rise or fall over time with appointments of new 
leaders, alterations in the legal structure of the central bank, or successful applications of political 
pressures on those leaders. A higher value of the variance of this objective effectively pushes up the 
overall net relative weight on inflation in the central bank's decision-making process, which causes the 
agents' endogenous inflation expectation to decline. At the same time, an increase in this variance 
boosts expected deviations of planned money growth from agents' conditional expectation of money 
growth. Central bank credibility declines, and consequently a higher output loss results from a given 
disinflation. Thus, when the central bank experiences a greater variance of innovations to its 
employment objective, lower expected inflation is associated with higher output losses from 
disinflations. 
Comparing these two examples indicates that the net relationship between expected inflation and 
output losses from disinflations depends on underlying parameters that simultaneously influence both 
variables. Hence, taking into account policy credibility considerations yields a theoretically ambiguous 
relationship between observed values of expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. 
The indirect policymaker reputation channel 
Barro and Gordon ([ 8]) investigated how a monetary authority might establish an anti-inflation 
reputation to limit the inflationary bias of discretionary policymaking. Backus and Driffill ([ 2],[ 3]) 
famously pursued this idea within an explicit dynamic-game-theoretic reputational model. In their 
model, a central bank known to have a tough anti-inflation stance can credibly commit to low (or zero) 
inflation and thereby ensure that the output cost of a disinflation will be very low (and potentially 
zero). Backus and Driffill contemplate central banks that are either tough or weak in their anti-
inflationary stances and also consider private sectors that are tough or weak in terms of giving in on 
adjustment of their inflation expectations and settings for the nominal wage rate. 
Backus and Driffill ([ 3]) consider a special case of their reputational model in which the central bank is 
tough and the private sector is weak. They verify that actual and expected inflation and the output loss 
from a disinflation both fall toward zero, so that lower expected inflation is associated with 
a lower sacrifice ratio. They find that in the case of a weak central banker but a tough private sector, 
both expected inflation and the output cost of disinflating are high, so that higher expected inflation is 
associated with a higher sacrifice ratio. Thus, these two reputational cases imply a positive association 
between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. 
The indirect macroeconomic variability channel 
Considerable evidence—see Taylor ([27]), for example—indicates that reduced inflation volatility 
owing to diminished aggregate demand variability is directly associated with lower mean inflation, 
reduced inflation forecast errors, and decreased inflation expectations. In addition, the theory of 
optimal length of nominal contracts developed by Gray ([21]) indicates that a reduction in aggregate 
demand variability reduces optimal contract length. To the extent that greater policy credibility 
reduces volatility of aggregate demand, the degree of nominal wage and price stickiness should 
decrease. 
Thus, as noted by Gray and Kandil ([22]), greater macroeconomic stability and increased wage and 
price flexibility can simultaneously result when policymaking reduces aggregate demand volatility. This 
insight yields the final indirect channel through which inflation expectations can be related to the 
sacrifice ratio. On the one hand, greater macroeconomic stability brought about by a more credible 
policy process implies both lower inflation volatility and hence mean inflation. On the other hand, the 
enhanced stability of aggregate demand associated with greater policy credibility also reduces nominal 
contract length and thereby boosts the flexibilities of wages and prices and tends to reduce output 
losses resulting from disinflations. Taken together, this final policy credibility channel thereby yields a 
positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. This last channel operating 
through the policy credibility process thereby suggests that higher expected inflation potentially could 
be associated with a higher sacrifice ratio, thereby implying a positive relationship between the two 
variables. 
Summary 
Economists typically appeal to wage and price rigidities to rationalize the observation of output losses 
that accompany disinflations, which, since Ball's ([ 4]) original contribution, have been measured with 
sacrifice ratios. If we were to limit ourselves solely to this basic explanation for the observation of 
positive sacrifice ratios, we would predict that higher expected inflation accompanying an increased 
actual mean inflation rate would be associated with a lower sacrifice ratio. That is, we would anticipate 
observing an estimated negative relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio in the 
available data. 
Once the potential importance of various policy credibility effects is taken into account, however, the 
predicted sign of this relationship becomes less obvious. Endogenously-determined inflation 
expectations and the credibility of macroeconomic policymaking, which in turn influences the output 
losses from disinflations, can move in tandem or in opposing directions, depending on magnitudes of 
underlying structural parameters. Hence, consideration of influence of the credibility of policies yields 
an ambiguous prediction for the relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. 
Although dynamic-game-theoretic models of policymaker reputation could be made sufficiently 
complicated to generate a negative relationship, the implication of accounting for reputational 
considerations is that expected inflation is more likely to be positively related to the sacrifice ratio. 
Finally, macroeconomic volatility induced by policymaking, which depends on the overall credibility of 
the policy process, impinges on the optimal durations of nominal contracts that motivate output losses 
from disinflations. Taking this channel into consideration predicts a positive relationship between 
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Overall, taking into account all three indirect channels 
operating through the macroeconomic policy process yields the prediction of a likely positive sign for 
the relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio, although some scope for ambiguity 
is present. 
Overall, taking into account the various channels in combination yields a theoretically uncertain 
relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. Consequently, in the next section we 
turn to the data for guidance regarding the relationship that actually exists between these two 
variables. 
DATA 
Much of our empirical data comes from the meta-study of the determinants of the sacrifice ratio by 
Daniels, Mazumder, and VanHoose ([12]). These authors derive their sacrifice ratio data from Bowdler 
([10]) and extend his data set to cover 1973–2004. The primary data source for that data is the 
International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics. Focusing on this dataset, we can 
directly compare our results with the various models in their study. The data set covers 20 OECD 
countries for the period 1973 through 2004 for a total of 69 usable observations.[ 1] 
The sacrifice ratio (SAC) is the dependent variable in our regression models and is based on the seminal 
work of Ball ([ 4]). The sacrifice ratio is measured as the ratio of actual less trend output, to the amount 
of disinflation during a disinflationary period. Using the centered eight-quarter moving average of 
actual quarterly inflation, an inflation peak (trough) is a period in which trend inflation is higher (lower) 
than in the previous two years. A disinflation episode is then defined as a period of time beginning with 
a peak and ending at a trough, where trend inflation declines by at least 1.5 percent. 
To measure trend output, it is assumed that output is at trend at an inflation peak and returns to its 
trend one year after the end of a disinflationary episode. Trend output is assumed to grow log-linearly 
between the peak and trough. The numerator of the sacrifice ratio, therefore, is the sum of the 
differences between trend output, and the log of actual output. The denominator of the sacrifice ratio 
is simply the amount of disinflation during an episode. 
Independent variables begin with the speed of the disinflation as measured by the length (Length) of 
the disinflation episode in years. Peak inflation (Peak) is the initial level of inflation at the start of a 
disinflation episode. The relative inflation loss (RInfLoss) is measured as the amount of disinflation over 
an episode relative to the initial level of inflation at the start of the episode (Peak). We use this 
measure to capture diminishing returns to inflation reductions (e.g., it is likely that the output loss 
associated with a 2 percent inflation reduction when initial inflation is 10 percent would be smaller 
than the output loss associated with a 2 percent inflation loss when initial inflation is, say, 3 percent). 
The degree of trade openness (Openness) follows Romer ([24]) who focuses only in the cross-sectional 
variance of this measure so as to reduce potential endogeneity. His measure, therefore, is the period-
average of the ratio of imports to GDP. Our measure of Central Bank Independence (CBI) follows 
Daniels, Nourzad, and VanHoose ([13]) who employ data from Franzese ([17]). To capture expected 
inflation (ExpInf), we use the inflation forecasts from various issues of the OECD Economic Outlook.[ 2] 
Specifically, we use the next-year inflation forecast from the December issue of the Economic 
Outlook immediately prior to a disinflationary episode. This year-ahead forecast is based on the most 
recent, but incomplete, inflation information. The relative change in expected inflation (RelΔExpInf) is 
simply the difference between the OECD inflation forecast at the end of a disinflationary episode and 
the measure of expected inflation, ExpInf, at the beginning of the episode relative to the level of 
inflation expectations, ExpInf. Hence, the relative change in inflation expectations is consistent with 
the relative change in inflation, RInfLoss. 
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix for all the independent variables. The key variables of interest for 
this study are Peak, RInfLoss, ExpInf, and RelΔExpInf. Among the four variables, the only statistically 
significant pairwise correlations are between Peak and ExpInf, which have a positive correlation that is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and between Peak and RInfLoss which have a negative 
correlation that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table 2. Correlation matrix between independent variables 
 
Length Peak RInfLoss Openness CBI ExpInf RelΔExpInf 
Length 1 
      
Peak 0.041 1 
     
RInfLoss 0.523*** −0.200* 1 
    
Openness −0.005 −0.017 −0.097 1 
   
CBI −0.053 −0.317*** 0.105 −0.032 1 
  
ExpInf 0.080 0.808*** −0.100 0.081 −0.220* 1 
 
RelΔExpInf −0.003 −0.177 −0.055 0.167 −0.106 −0.107 1 
1 *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
We turn to our main empirical analyses, in which we regress the sacrifice ratio on various determinants 
that are considered standard in the literature. Aside from the length of disinflationary episodes, the 
amount of disinflation is also frequently included in typical sacrifice ratio regressions, such as in Ball 
([ 4]). As stated in the previous section we define relative inflation loss as the amount of inflation loss 
divided by inflation at the onset of an episode, where this transformed variable has lower correlations 
with the other regressors. Hence, in Model 1 of each table of results reported below, we use a fairly 
typical specification of regressing the sacrifice ratio on a constant, trade openness, the length of the 
disinflation episode, and the relative inflation loss. Because of the correlation 
between Peak and ExpInf, we first add Peak (initial inflation). As noted by Ball ([ 4]), theory suggests 
that the sacrifice ratio should be lower with higher initial inflation.[ 3] Hence, we expect this variable to 
have a negative relationship with the sacrifice ratio. 
We next add to the first model the interaction between the length of the episode and Peak (Model 2), 
where we test to see whether initial inflation matters when considered alongside the speed of 
disinflation. In Model 3, we employ the Daniels et al. ([13]) model that tests central bank 
independence, while Model 4 modifies this slightly by adding the interaction between central bank 
independence and initial inflation. 
In subsection 4.1 that follows, we focus on evaluating the evidence concerning the fundamental issue 
of what the data tell us about the actual relationship between the level of the expected inflation rate 
and the sacrifice ratio vis-à-vis conflicting predictions of the alternative theories discussed in Section 2. 
In subsection 4.2, we seek to delve more deeply into how other independent variables that might 
affect the sacrifice ratio affect nature of this relationship. In addition, we explore empirically the 
potential of differential sacrifice-ratio effects of the level of inflation expectations vis-à-vis changes in 
inflation expectations that have not generally been addressed explicitly in the theoretical literature. 
Results for initial inflation and for the level of expected inflation 
The results for our four basic regression models and focusing separately on peak inflation and expected 
inflation can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, respectively, in which we utilize pooled OLS with robust 
standard errors (clustered at the country level). As is well documented in the literature, in all four 
columns of Table 3, we see that the length of a disinflationary episode is a positive and statistically 
significant determinant of the sacrifice ratio. In other words, longer disinflations are costlier in terms of 
more lost GDP. This, in turn, is what motivates the idea of 'cold-turkey' disinflation, for which fast 
reductions in the level of trend inflation are often encouraged. In all specifications we find that trade 
openness is a negative and significant determinant of SAC, as argued in Daniels et al. ([13]), in which in 
a more open economy, a real depreciation causes the price of foreign goods and services to rise 
proportionately faster than that of domestic goods and services, causing higher inflation. Indeed, a real 
depreciation which raises domestic firms' costs leads to a larger increase in domestic prices for any rise 
in domestic output. While relative inflation loss in Table 3 always produces the expected negative sign, 
we never obtain statistical significance for this variable. In Models 3 and 4, we find the coefficients on 
central bank independence to be positive but not a statistically significant determinant of the sacrifice 
ratio. In Models 1 and 3 (models without an interaction term), the coefficient on Peak is negative and 
statistically significant, in line with a priori expectations. In Models 2 and 4, the total effect of Peak is 
negative and statistically significant. 
Table 3. Sacrifice ratio regressions with peak inflation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Openness −0.026*** (0.007) −0.027*** (0.007) −0.025*** (0.008) −0.025*** (0.007) 
Length 0.545*** (0.097) 1.014*** (0.315) 0.553*** (0.099) 0.549*** (0.100) 
RInfLoss −0.439 (0.676) −0.722 (0.691) −0.496 (0.681) −0.501 (0.681) 







0.826 (0.560) 1.531 (1.367) 
CBI × Peak 
   
−0.082 (0.129) 
Constant 0.755 (0.635) −1.018 (1.159) 0.295 (0.632) 0.056 (0.750) 





Observations 69 69 69 69 
R2 0.375 0.429 0.382 0.384 
Adj. R2 0.336 0.383 0.333 0.324 
 
In Table 4, we repeat this exercise, substituting the level of inflation expectations, ExpInf for Peak. In 
cases in which the level of expected inflation is used alone in the sacrifice ratio regression (Models 1 
and 3), we find a statistically significant negative coefficient, albeit it with a small magnitude, in which 
we obtain coefficients in the region of about −0.06. This thus agrees with the side of the theory that 
argues that higher expected inflation tends to be associated with lower sacrifice ratios. Namely, the 
nominal wage and price rigidity channel outlined in section 2.1, agrees with this finding, whereby 
reductions in wage and price stickiness caused by higher rates of output and input price inflation, leads 
to diminished tradeoffs between reductions in inflation and total output. 
Table 4. Sacrifice ratio regressions with expected inflation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Openness −0.023** (0.008) −0.023*** (0.008) −0.023** (0.008) −0.021** (0.008) 
Length 0.534*** (0.101) 0.997** (0.371) 0.546*** (0.103) 0.521*** (0.106) 
RInfLoss −0.189 (0.611) −0.600 (0.683) −0.305 (0.619) −0.262 (0.564) 







1.050* (0.570) 2.652** (1.046) 
CBI × ExpInf 
   
−0.254** (0.112) 
Constant 0.394 (0.547) −1.269 (1.192) −0.122 (0.540) −0.699 (0.509) 





Observations 69 69 69 69 
R2 0.362 0.413 0.374 0.389 
Adj. R2 0.322 0.367 0.324 0.330 
 
In Model 2, we find a negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between length and 
expected inflation. This tells us that inflation expectations condition the length of disinflationary 
episodes, which we always find to have a positive effect on the sacrifice ratio. In particular, a negative 
coefficient for the interaction terms shows that quickly adjusting expectations allows policymakers to 
pursue reductions in trend inflation all the more aggressively. Also notice that the fit of the model, as 
seen by the adjusted-R2, rises substantially—by about 30 percent—when we add the interaction term 
from Model 1 to get the results seen in Model 2. In this model, we also consider the total effect of 
expected inflation on SAC, by combining the coefficients on the interaction term with expected 
inflation (assuming length to be equal to its mean value), and we see that the overall impact of 
expected inflation on output losses of disinflation is negative and statistically significant. Hence, the 
results for Peak and ExpInf are very similar across Models 1 and 2. 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 4, however, provides differing results than Models 3 and 4 for Peak. When 
inflation expectations are substituted for initial inflation, the coefficient on CBI is positive and 
statistically significant (albeit at the 10 percent level) in Model 3 and is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level in Model 4. Further, the interaction terms between CBI and ExpInf is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This latter result indicates that a more 
independent central bank that embarks upon a tightening of monetary policy, beginning from a high 
level of expected inflation, is able to lower the output losses incurred during this disinflation episode. 
In other words, this gives some credence to the rational expectations notion that disinflation can be 
'costless' if the central bank makes a credible announcement of their goal of reducing inflation, if one 
uses central bank independence as a proxy for credibility. This finding is tempered, however, when we 
consider the total effect of CBI on the sacrifice ratio and find it to be an effect that is statistically equal 
to zero. Similar to the results for Peak, the total effect of expected inflation on the sacrifice ratio (while 
also including its interaction with central bank independence) is negative and statistically significant. 
Further exploration of the empirical relationship among expected inflation, the sacrifice 
ratio, and other explanatory variables 
Our above results indicate unambiguously that, consistent with theories based on nominal stickiness, 
the empirical relationship between the level of expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio is negative. 
These results also suggest, however, that interactions exist among inflation expectations and other 
independent variables that influence the sacrifice ratio. In the remainder of this section, we seek to 
explore more fully the nature of these interactions. In the process, we shall demonstrate that 
the level of inflation expectations and changes in inflation expectations have individually unique effects 
on the sacrifice ratio. 
First, note that Models 2 and 4 of Tables and indicate that both initial inflation and the level of inflation 
expectations have a moderating effect on, or condition, the impact of the length of the disinflation 
period and central bank independence (as captured by the interaction terms). Models 3 and 4, 
however, indicate that initial inflation and the level of inflation expectations affect the influence 
of CBI on the SAC differently. We explore this further by considering mediation effects. That is, do 
initial inflation and inflation expectations carry the influence of CBI on the sacrifice ratio? To do this, 
we first test and find that: ( 1) CBI statistically significantly affects the Peak; ( 2) CBI statistically 
significantly affects the SAC in absences of Peak; ( 3) Peak has a statistically significant effect on 
the SAC, and; ( 4) the impact or coefficient on CBI declines with the inclusion of Peak. Following this, 
results for the Sobel-Goodman mediation test show that the overall coefficient of CBI is 1.531 
(consistent with Model 4) but that 0.526, or 39 percent, of this total effect is an indirect effect carried 
by Peak. Hence, Peak is a mediating variable that carries a statistically significant (p-value of 0.023) 
indirect effect of CBI on the SAC. This has important policy implications for central banks, which may 
be able to exploit the tradeoff between inflation and output further if the level of peak inflation is high 
at the start of a disinflationary episode. 
We also test the level of inflation expectations as a mediator. Though it passes the first four tests 
described above, the indirect effect is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.137).[ 4] 
One could easily argue that the way in which expected inflation should be incorporated into a sacrifice 
ratio regression is by examining the change in expected inflation, rather than the level of expected 
inflation, over the course of a disinflation episode. Therefore, in Table 5, we reproduce the previous 
regressions except with the relative change in expected inflation over the course of the disinflation 
rather than the level of expected inflation or peak. The results of Models 1 and 3 are similar to the 
level of expected inflation in that the coefficient on RelΔExpInf is negative and statistically significant 
and the coefficient on CBI is positive and statistically significant in Model 3. We also find the relative 
change in the expected inflation coefficient to be positive in Model 2 of Table 5. Nevertheless, 
consistent with our results regarding the level of inflation expectations in subsection 4.1, the total 
effect of the change in expected inflation on the sacrifice ratio remains negative and significant. 
Table 5. Sacrifice ratio regressions with relative change in expected inflation 
 

















RInfLoss 0.006 (0.567) −0.059 (0.577) −0.159 (0.615) −0.128 (0.621) 
RelΔExpInf −0.039*** 
(0.013) 










1.220** (0.548) 1.390** (0.646) 
CBI × RelΔExpInf 
   
−0.106 (0.114) 
Constant −0.118 (0.500) −0.238 (0.517) −0.648 (0.521) −0.792 (0.562) 







Observations 69 69 69 69 
R2 0.352 0.360 0.369 0.370 
Adj. R2 0.312 0.309 0.319 0.309 
 
Thus, whether we employ the level of expected inflation or the change in expected inflation as an 
independent variable, we find it has a negative and statistically significant effect on the sacrifice ratio. 
This tells us that a disinflation that successfully brings down the expected rate of inflation that prevails 
in an economy is one that has lower costs in terms of output losses.[ 5] 
We also consider whether the change in inflation expectations might carry the influence of CBI to the 
sacrifice ratio in a similar manner as initial inflation. That is, does RelΔExpInf serve as both a 
moderating variable (as shown by the interaction term in Model 4) and a mediating variable? Following 
the process described above, RelΔExpInf is indeed a mediating variable. The total effect (coefficient) 
of CBI on the SAC is 1.390 as shown in Model 3 of Table with 10 percent of the effect (0.1309) being a 
statistically significant indirect effect carried by RelΔExpInf. Therefore, the change in expected inflation 
is a mediating variable, whereas we reported earlier that the level of expected inflation was not. This 
indicates that central banks are changing the output costs of disinflation through their impact on 
inflation expectations. In other words, part of the effect on output of reducing the trend inflation rate 
comes about through changing the expected rate of inflation. 
Results for tests for individual or unique effects 
To this point, our regressions have considered initial inflation and the relative change in inflation 
expectations separately and the initial level of expected inflation and the relative change in inflation 
expectations separately. Tables 6 and 7 provide results when the models include both variables. The 
results provided in Table 6 show that Peak is statistically significant across all models and RelΔExpInf is 
statistically significant in Models 1 and 3, and that the total effect of RelΔExpInf is statistically 
significant in Models 2 and 4. We conclude, therefore, that Peak and RelΔExpInf have unique effects 
on the sacrifice ratio. 
Table 6. Sacrifice ratio regressions with peak and relative change in expected inflation 
 






































0.514 (0.570) 0.447 (0.687) 
CBI × RelΔExpInf 
   
0.036 (0.124) 
Constant 0.909 (0.547) 0.796 (0.581) 0.617 (0.531) 0.681 (0.638) 








Observations 69 69 69 69 
R2 0.416 0.427 0.418 0.418 
Adj. R2 0.369 0.372 0.362 0.352 
 
Table 7 repeats this exercise, substituting the level of expected inflation, ExpInf, for Peak. Similar to 
the results in Table 6, ExpInf is statistically significant across all models, RelΔExpInf is statistically 
significant in Models 1 through 3, and the total effect of RelΔExpInf is statistically significant in Models 
2 and 4. Again we conclude that ExpInf and RelΔExpInf have unique effects on the sacrifice ratio. 
Table 7. Sacrifice ratio regressions with expected inflation and relative change in expected inflation 
 








































0.843 (0.583) 0.890 (0.730) 
CBI × RelΔExpInf 
   
−0.027 (0.138) 
Constant 0.454 (0.489) 0.336 (0.520) 0.0362 (0.488) −0.006 (0.598) 








Observations 69 69 69 69 
R2 0.395 0.409 0.402 0.402 
Adj. R2 0.347 0.352 0.345 0.334 
 
CONCLUSION 
Contemplation of alternative theoretical rationales for a relationship between expected inflation and 
the sacrifice ratio yields an uncertain net prediction. On the one hand, consideration of nominal wage 
and price rigidities as the standard motivation for the observation of positive sacrifice ratios leads to a 
predicted negative relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio. On the other hand, 
taking into account the influence of channels emanating from the macroeconomic policy process 
suggests that a positive relationship between expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio is likely, 
although some scope for ambiguity is present. 
Our generally consistent empirical finding of the existence of a negative relationship between the level 
of (and changes in) expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio has two important implications. The most 
obvious of these is that the direct channel linking expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio that 
operates through the mechanism of wage and price stickiness appears to be more important. The 
finding of a net negative relationship does not rule out positive effects emanating from the policy 
channels that theory also indicates should be present. This finding does, however, suggest that these 
latter policy-based effects are of secondary empirical magnitude. 
The second implication of our results derives from the immediately preceding point. As we noted in 
our discussion in subsection 2.1 of the direct channel linking expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio, 
traditional theories of wage and price stickiness can generate output losses from disinflations that 
forward-looking New Keynesian theories typically cannot without reference to imperfect policy 
credibility. As discussed in subsection 2.2, however, a prediction of a negative relationship between 
expected inflation and the sacrifice ratio is difficult to glean from a theory that relies on imperfect 
policy credibility as a basis for output losses to arise from disinflations. Thus, our general finding of a 
negative relationship in the data calls into question New Keynesian motivations for positive sacrifice 
ratios that hinge on imperfect policy credibility. More work may be required to render forward-looking 
New Keynesian models appropriate for analyzing issues relating to output losses generated by 
disinflations. 
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Footnotes 
1 Countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The complete data set is available from the authors upon request. 
2 We are not aware of alternative measures of inflation expectations that have the comprehensive time and 
country coverage that the empirical exercise in this paper requires. When such data become available, 
future research should examine whether our main findings are consistent with these data. 
3 The results for peak inflation in Ball ([4]) are not statistically significant. He concludes that this is a result of the 
collinearity between initial inflation and the inflation loss. Because of the way in which we measure 
inflation loss, the two variables are not correlated, as shown in Table 2. 
4 We also considered whether Peak and ExpInf might be mediators for the length of disinflation. Neither 
variable passed all four of the tests described above nor had a statistically significant indirect effect. We 
conclude that the two variables have only moderating effects on Length. 
5 Due to the nature and number of data points, the influence of outliers may be an issue. As a robustness test, 
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